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BOOKS BY GENERAL F. V. GREENE 

Published bt CHAKLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IN THE 

UNITED STATES. 12mo . ... net $0.75 

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND THE MILITARY 
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. With Maps. 
8vo ne/$2.50 

THE MISSISSIPPI. With Maps. (Campaigns of the 

Civil War.) 12mo net $1.00 



THE PRESENT 

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE 

UNITED STATES 



THE PRESENT 

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE 

UNITED STATES 



BY 

FRANCIS VINTON GREENE 

GRADUATE OF WEST POINT; MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. V. 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
1915 









Copyright, 1915, by 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



Published February, 1915 




FEB 25 1915 



CI. A 3 91 880 



PREFACE 

The following pages are, substantially, a 
reprint of an address recently delivered in 
Portland, Maine, at the request of the Eco- 
nomic Club of that city. 

I hope that they may, in some small degree, 
help to persuade the civilians, the voters, the 
"plain people" of Lincoln, the lovers of peace 
and all its infinite benefits, to give calm but 
thoughtful consideration to this question of 
adequate national defense. It is eminently 
worthy of their consideration. 

Francis V. Greene. 

Buffalo, February x, 191 5. 



THE PRESENT 

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE 

UNITED STATES 



THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 

I feel somewhat diffident in speaking in such 
distinguished company, and I should hesitate 
to appear with them,* but for the fact that all 
my life I have studied — and at times written 
upon — the important subject which is under 
discussion to-night; and, I may frankly say, 
have never accomplished anything by any- 
thing I have ever written upon it. I am not 
alone in that. The most distinguished soldiers 
we have ever had — General Sherman in par- 
ticular — have written to the same effect, but 
without producing the slightest impression 
upon the minds of their countrymen. In 1876, 
more than a generation ago, General Sherman 
was chairman of a commission appointed by 

* The other speakers were Lieutenant-General Nelson A. 
Miles, U. S. Army, and Professor John Graham Brooks, of 
Harvard; one of them the only survivor of the leading gen- 
erals in the Civil War and of the great Indian-fighters of 1865- 
1890, and the other, one of the most profound economic 
students of the day. 

3 



4 MILITARY SITUATION 

Act of Congress to study and report upon this 
same question that we are discussing to-night, 
viz. : the question of our national defense and 
the formulation of a military policy suited 
to our special requirements. Nobody now 
knows that this commission was appointed; 
the fact has long since been forgotten. I 
know about it because I was for a time the 
secretary of the commission. General Sher- 
man was then in command of the army, a 
soldier of world-wide reputation. His vivid 
memoirs had already been published: his 
duties as commanding general of the army 
(the constitutional Commander-in-Chief, who 
at that time was also a great general, Grant, 
and the Secretary of War being present) were 
not such as to deprive him of the leisure 
necessary for this important work; and, as 
we all know, he wielded the pen not so much 
of a ready writer as of a vigorous soldier, 
and he expressed his thoughts clearly, in- 
cisively. And General Sherman threw himself 
into the task as chairman of this commission 
with his usual enthusiasm. He thought that 



IN THE UNITED STATES 5 

perhaps he might be instrumental in formu- 
lating a definite military policy for this coun- 
try, and he welcomed the chance of doing this, 
which he hoped would be the capstone of 
his military career. He searched our mil- 
itary archives from the time of Washington 
to the time of Grant. He pored over the end- 
less and tiresome documents in those mass- 
ive quartos entitled "American State Pa- 
pers/ ' * and particularly the seven volumes on 
"Military Affairs," March 3, 1789, to March 
1, 1838, the existence of which is now known 
only to the historical specialist of more than 
ordinary curiosity. He examined all the un- 
published records of the Mexican War. He 
was himself the creator of a great part of the 
most valuable records of the Civil War, then 
just beginning to be published. He worked 
ten and twelve hours a day at this, with the 
same ardor that he displayed in his pursuit 

* "American State Papers. Military Affairs." Vols. Ill 
to VII (1823 to 1838) and vols. XII and XIII (1789 to 1825), 
selected and edited, under the authority of Congress, by 
the secretary of the Senate and the clerk of the House of 
Representatives. Large quartos, about 1,000 pages and 
3,000,000 words in each volume. 



6 MILITARY SITUATION 

of the wily Joe Johnston from Chattanooga 
to Atlanta. From all these voluminous data 
of millions of words he prepared a history of 
the army and of our military policy — or lack 
of policy — concise, accurate. The curious, if 
so minded, may find it in the musty records 
of the Forty-fourth Congress, as a Senate 
Executive Document. Not content with 
his own researches and opinions, he sum- 
moned the principal soldiers of the Civil War 
(it was only eleven years after Appomattox 
and most of them were still living) to testify 
before the commission and to put in writing 
their matured views as to what ought to 
be the military policy of the United States, 
and the proper organization of our military 
strength and enormous but undeveloped mil- 
itary resources in order to carry this policy 
into effect. Hancock, Schofield, McDowell, 
McClellan, Terry, Pope, Ord, Humphreys, 
Meigs, Townsend, and Garfield responded in 
short but comprehensive papers. 

After nearly seven months of this labor 
the documents were transmitted to Congress, 



IN THE UNITED STATES 7 

with a definite, explicit recommendation as to 
the legislation necessary to give us a definite 
military policy. 

What happened? The documents were 
printed, part of the tons of documents which 
come out of the Government Printing Office 
during every session of Congress. No more. 
There was a brief debate, no action, and the 
subject was dropped. Two years later a 
"Joint Committee on the Reorganization of 
the Army" was appointed, with General Burn- 
side, then a Senator from Rhode Island, as 
chairman and General M. C. Butler, then a 
Senator from South Carolina, as one of its 
members. The survivors of the Civil War 
who had held high command were again 
summoned to give their testimony, eminent 
civilians were called upon to give their views, 
again a document was printed (Forty-fifth 
Congress, 3rd Session, Senate Report No. 555, 
pp. 512), and again, after a brief debate, the 
subject was dropped. It was not seriously 
taken up again for thirty years. 

Why was this? Because in the brief de- 



8 MILITARY SITUATION 

bates above referred to it was stated — and 
then, as always, Congress represented with 
substantial accuracy the opinion of the ma- 
jority of the voters — that this country would 
never again be engaged in war; and there- 
fore, in the midst of such pressing questions 
as the building of the Western railroads, the 
resumption of specie payments, the silver 
question, and the tariff, there was no time 
to think about the needs of the army. There 
was no "military situation in the United 
States' ' worth thinking about. 

From this dream of perpetual peace we 
were rudely awakened by the war in 1898, in 
which the loss of life and the expenditure of 
money were so comparatively small, but of 
which the consequences to us have been so 
momentous. Still, our people continued to 
think that the chances of war were quite 
remote; and the subject of military prepara- 
tion a matter of small importance, compared 
with the regulation of public-service corpora- 
tions, the control of monopoly, the improve- 
ment j}f our banking system, and the other 



IN THE UNITED STATES 9 

great questions pressing hard for considera- 
tion upon a very busy people. The events 
of the last six months, however, have at last 
opened the eyes of our people to the fact 
that, while we are comparatively immune 
from the dangers of war which beset the 
peoples of Europe, yet we are by no means 
completely immune. They begin to realize 
that the "present military situation" is a 
subject which deserves their consideration, that 
it is of equal importance — perhaps greater 
importance — than the federal reserve banking 
law, the income tax, the Sherman law, the 
tariff, the extension of our commerce, and 
the rebuilding of our merchant marine; and 
therefore it is a subject worthy of calm, se- 
rious deliberation. 

There is no need of excitement about it, no 
cause for hysteria. We do not need and will 
not have in this country an army of 700,000 
men, as some ill-balanced enthusiasts demand; 
we are not compelled to, and we will not, 
enter the battleship race of England and Ger- 
many. England must run this race — or die. 



10 MILITARY SITUATION 

We are not so situated, and it would be su- 
preme folly for us to waste our resources or our 
thoughts in any such contest. But we do 
need to give such thought to this matter as is 
necessary, in order to compel our representa- 
tives in Congress so to organize our latent 
but enormous military strength that no na- 
tion shall ever undertake to disturb our se- 
curity, or attempt to prevent us from working 
out our great destiny in the pursuits of peace. 
One other question I should like to refer 
to here. Does preparation for war result in 
preserving peace or in inviting war? Many 
men of eminence, presidents of universities, 
leaders of public opinion, have recently as- 
serted that the great conflict which is now 
devastating Europe has forever disposed of 
the fallacy that preparation for war helps to 
preserve peace. In my humble opinion this 
is a hasty, ill-considered judgment and — if I 
may say so without offense to these univer- 
sity presidents who are not only my personal 
friends, but are men justly entitled to lead 
public opinion and for whom, in common with 



IN THE UNITED STATES 11 

thousands of others, I have very great admi- 
ration — it is a shallow judgment, due to the 
mental perturbation naturally arising from 
contemplation of this most appalling of all 
catastrophes. The sober truth is that if 
preparations for war are made with a view 
to attack and for purposes of conquest, then 
unquestionably such preparations do lead to 
counter-preparations on the part of the na- 
tion against which the attack is planned; they 
lead to a race in armaments, ever increasing 
in magnitude, constantly draining the re- 
sources of the people, creating a military 
caste like that of Germany, which steadily 
grows more insolent and insulting in all its 
references to its intended adversary; and at 
the same time creating in the minds of the 
taxpayer and the man of business the feeling 
that the cost of armament is greater than 
the probable cost of war, and that it were 
better that the war should come and be done 
with it, and the air cleared, as by a thunder- 
storm, so that they can resume their ordi- 
nary avocations without this dreadful night- 



12 MILITARY SITUATION 

mare hanging over them; and finally the 
cataclysm, such as we are now witnessing, 
does inevitably result. If, on the other hand, 
these preparations are made, not with any 
purpose of conquest, but solely to enable a 
nation to pursue its peaceful development 
without risk of interference from envious 
rivals or competitors; and if such preparations 
are so carefully but economically made (as is 
easily possible in our case) that even the 
most powerful nation will think it best, on 
the whole, not to try military conclusions 
with us, then I assert without fear of suc- 
cessful contradiction that such preparation 
does not invite war but does, on the con- 
trary, tend to prevent war; and it does cer- 
tainly do everything that human foresight 
can suggest to prevent that horrible calamity. 
And I should not make this assertion with 
such vehemence were it not that it has the 
support of George Washington; who over 
and over again, on every suitable occasion 
during the sixteen years between the close of 
the Revolution and his death in 1799, argued, 



IN THE UNITED STATES 13 

with his unrivalled wisdom and with all the 
force of his strong nature, in the effort to con- 
vince his countrymen of the soundness of the 
views which I have, so imperfectly as com- 
pared with him, attempted to express. 

Gentlemen, in these days, some people, in 
Massachusetts and elsewhere, have expressed 
the opinion that Washington was not only a 
poor soldier but an indifferent statesman; that 
he was a man of good character but in pub- 
lic affairs was not much more than a re- 
spectable figure-head; that such military rep- 
utation as he gained was due simply to the 
fatuous mistakes of his adversaries; and that 
his political reputation was due to a skilful 
use of the thoughts of the great statesmen of 
the period — the two Adamses, Franklin, Jef- 
ferson, and Hamilton. 

I do not share these views. As to his mil- 
itary reputation and whether it was deserved 
or not I have dealt elsewhere, at some length.* 
I believe that he was one of the great soldiers 
of history, and that if he had died within a 

* "The Revolutionary War." Chas. Scribner's Sons, 191 1. 



14 MILITARY SITUATION 

year after the battle of Yorktown, and his 
military services had not been overshadowed 
by his transcendent political services, this 
opinion would be concurred in with substan- 
tial unanimity. And I believe, also, as it was 
generally believed throughout the whole pe- 
riod of the nineteenth century, that he was 
the greatest statesman of all time; that his was 
the master mind; and that the two Adamses 
and Franklin and Jefferson and Hamilton 
and Madison were only his subordinate coad- 
jutors in devising and organizing this gov- 
ernment of which we are so proud, and which 
for five generations we have held up to the 
world as a model of good government and 
as the hope of mankind struggling to free 
itself from the despotism of the past. 

I beseech you, therefore, with all the ear- 
nestness that I can command, to study what 
Washington said and wrote concerning the 
desirability and the necessity of preparing 
for war in time of peace. What he said on 
this subject forms no inconsiderable part of 
his voluminous writings, which were collected 



IN THE UNITED STATES 15 

and printed in 12 volumes by Sparks in 1837, 
and later in 14 volumes by Worthington C. 
Ford in 1893. His views on this subject, 
like the principles of strategy, are eternal. 
They have not been changed by steam or 
electricity or the marvellous industrial de- 
velopment of the nineteenth century and 
the early part of this twentieth century in 
which we are privileged to live. They are 
fixed and immutable, far more so than the 
fabled laws of the Medes and Persians, as to 
the nature of which no one has any accurate 
knowledge. Our situation in this year 1915 
is as different from our situation at the close 
of the eighteenth century as it is possible for 
the human mind to imagine; but the writings 
of Washington on this question of national 
defense are just as wise, just as pertinent, just 
as applicable to-day as they were when they 
were uttered a century and a quarter ago. I 
beg of you to go to your public library, get 
the volumes of Sparks and Ford, and read 
them with careful attention. 
There is no great danger in the present 



16 MILITARY SITUATION 

situation, no danger whatever provided we 
utilize in a judicious manner a small portion 
of the enormous resources at our disposal. 
These resources have hitherto not been so 
utilized. All that I can hope to do this 
evening is to convince you of this fact. 
Once you and other voters are convinced of 
it, there is no doubt that, with the ordinary 
common sense which has always character- 
ized this government of ours "by the people/' 
the proper solution of the question will be 
found. Naturally, the subject appeals more 
closely in the first instance to the people who 
live on the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, 
across which must come our enemies if we 
are ever to be attacked. But, if the idea 
takes possession of the people on the seacoasts 
that this is a matter worth thinking about, 
the thought will quite rapidly penetrate to 
the interior, and the people of Chicago and 
Saint Louis and Kansas City and Denver 
will be quite as much interested as the peo- 
ple of New York and Boston and Portland. 
The inhabitants of the interior cities will re- 



IN THE UNITED STATES 17 

alize that while they are far beyond the 
twenty-mile range of the most powerful guns 
now afloat, yet they are by no means beyond 
the range of the financial and industrial dis- 
aster which will surely overtake them if a 
landing should be effected in the vicinity of 
New York or Boston or San Francisco, and 
either of those cities should be subjected to 
an indemnity levied according to the methods 
now in vogue. 



Any discussion of our "present military 
situation" necessarily raises the question 
whether there is any military situation, and 
if so, why. That means, in plain English, Is 
there any such danger of our being attacked 
either on the Atlantic coast or on the Pacific 
coast, or on the three thousand miles of Ca- 
nadian boundary line, that ordinary caution 
and prudence, such caution and prudence as 
we exercise to prevent a remote but possible 
disaster in our private business, make it in- 



18 MILITARY SITUATION 

cumbent upon us as plain, sensible people to 
take measures, first, to prevent such an at- 
tack, if it be in our power to prevent it; and 
secondly, to repel the attack, if we cannot 
prevent it, and to repel it in such manner 
that the nation which undertakes it will 
never attempt it a second time ? 

There are some of my friends who say to 
me it is not wise to discuss such matters; it 
is injudicious to throw lighted matches where 
there is so much loose powder lying about; 
by talking about these things we shall bring 
about the very result we are seeking to avoid. 
Such is not my view. I do not believe that 
the ostrich has ever saved its neck by hiding 
its head in the sand. This question of na- 
tional defense against remote but still possi- 
ble dangers is a question that must be met 
manfully, calmly, prayerfully, if you like; and 
there is no harm in talking about it, no sense 
in attempting to disguise it. 

Now, the only guide for the future is a 
study of the past; and, before taking up the 
subject of our present relations and possible 



IN THE UNITED STATES 19 

future relations with the most powerful na- 
tions of Europe and of Asia, I should like to 
call your attention for a moment to the un- 
stable nature of political alliances and interna- 
tional friendships. They are as shifting as the 
sands of the desert. At the present time our 
relations with Great Britain are of the most 
friendly and cordial nature. It seems now 
unthinkable that the two greatest nations 
which speak the English language should ever 
be brought into conflict. Yet what has been 
the history of English alliances ? From 1757 
to 1763 England was engaged with France 
in a struggle for the control of the North 
American continent and of the destiny of 
India. Under the lead of Chatham — to my 
mind the most far-sighted, the most concilia- 
tory, and in every way the greatest of English 
statesmen — "the people of Massachusetts [I 
am quoting from Trevelyan's most fascinat- 
ing history] taxed themselves to the amount 
of two pounds in every three of their year's 
income for the defense of the British Empire. 
. . . Massachusetts — so close-fisted against 



20 MILITARY SITUATION 

any attempt to take her money without ask- 
ing her own consent — gave Pitt £140,000 in 20 
months, and loaded herself with debt when the 
yield from current taxation showed symptoms 
of dwindling. ,, What is now the State of 
Maine was then a part of Massachusetts. 
Do you realize that your ancestors raised 30,- 
000 men to fight in common with the men 
whom Chatham sent over from England and 
who decided on the Plains of Abraham the 
destiny of this continent — that it was to be 
English and not French ? 

Peace was proclaimed in 1763. French sov- 
ereignty was forever lost on this continent as 
well as in India, and the success in America 
was very largely due to the whole-hearted 
support of the colonies, and particularly those 
of New England. Only 12 years later the 
men of Massachusetts shot down the King's 
soldiers, to the number of 73 killed and 174 
wounded, between Concord and Boston; be- 
cause the royal Governor of Massachusetts 
had used the King's soldiers in an attempt to 
enforce an Act of Parliament which taxed them 



IN THE UNITED STATES 21 

without their consent. The war begun at Lex- 
ington lasted eight and a half years, the most 
bitter, as it was certainly the most disastrous, 
war in which England ever engaged. The 
French were then America's all-important al- 
lies. That war settled the question for all 
time, not only whether the colonists should be 
taxed without representation, but whether 
they should be taxed by the British Parlia- 
ment at all. 

The Seven Years' War, however (1757-63), 
did not settle the score between England and 
France. This was revived by the French 
Revolution, and for 23 years, from 1792 to 
1815, Great Britain fought a life-and-death 
struggle against Napoleon. This did finally 
settle the differences between France and Eng- 
land, and not long after Napoleon's down- 
fall these two nations began to be drawn 
together in commerce and friendship; in 1854 
they were full-fledged allies in a war against 
Russia. England had by now become con- 
vinced that her most dangerous rival was not 
France, but Russia, and that if Russia should 



22 MILITARY SITUATION 

possess Constantinople, she would have a 
position of vantage on the flank of the route 
to India, and would use it to England's injury. 
To prevent this, England, which had brought 
on the war, laid down the cardinal principle 
in the Treaty of Paris, in 1856, that it was 
necessary that the (unspeakable) Turk should 
remain in Constantinople and control the 
straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. 
England induced all the seven nations which 
signed the treaty, viz., France, Prussia, Russia, 
Austria, Sardinia, and Sweden, as well as 
herself, to agree that they would "respect 
the independence and territorial integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire/ ' By a separate con- 
vention, England induced France and Austria 
to guarantee this integrity and independence, 
and to consider any infraction of the Treaty 
of Paris a castes belli. 

From 1856 until some time after Bismarck 
formed the Triple Alliance with Austria and 
Italy, in 1883 — that is to say, for the period of 
nearly a generation — this principle of the in- 
tegrity of the Ottoman Empire, as a means 



IN THE UNITED STATES 23 

of preventing access of Russia to the Mediter- 
ranean, was the foundation and corner-stone 
of British diplomacy. But after the Triple 
Alliance had been formed, France, for self- 
protection, came to an understanding with 
Russia; and as the German commerce began 
to spread to all quarters of the globe; as the 
German industrial development began to in- 
crease by leaps and bounds; as goods "made 
in Germany" began to undersell British-made 
goods, not only in the distant markets but also 
in the British Isles themselves; as Germany 
began to send insulting messages during the 
Boer War, during the Algerian and Moroccan 
developments, and began to publish books in 
which England was spoken of as a decadent 
race, a land-robber, possessed of an empire 
which it had not the courage and ability to 
defend, England began to see that Germany 
and not Russia was her most dangerous rival. 
Her policy then shifted and she, too, came 
to an understanding with Russia. To-day 
she is fighting for her very life, with Russia as 
her most powerful ally; and it seems prob- 



24 MILITARY SITUATION 

able that as a recompense she will at the 
close of the war acquiesce in the delivery 
of Constantinople, and the control of the 
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, to Russia. 

To recapitulate, in the eighteenth century- 
England and her American colonies fought 
shoulder to shoulder against France. A few 
years later France and the American" colonies 
fought shoulder to shoulder against England. 
In the beginning of the nineteenth century 
England and Germany fought against France, 
and later England and France fought against 
Russia. In the twentieth century England, 
France, and Russia are fighting against Ger- 
many—in the most colossal of all wars. 

Why is it that nations thus shift their al- 
liances? The answer is, because nations ever 
have been, are now, and ever will be guided 
in their dealings with other nations by self- 
interest and self-interest alone. I am not 
now speaking my own opinions only; I am 
again quoting those of George Washington. 
We Americans have always been governed in 
our international dealings by self-interest and 



IN THE UNITED STATES 25 

self-interest alone. The first conspicuous in- 
stance of it occurred in November, 1778. A 
committee of Congress, in conjunction with 
the Marquis de LaFayette, and in correspond- 
ence with Doctor Franklin at Paris, had drawn 
up a plan for an attack on Canada, which 
was to be effected by the combined operations 
of the United States and France. It was a 
most delicate situation. We were under enor- 
mous obligations to France, and Washington 
had a peculiarly strong affection for LaFay- 
ette, whom, in the absence of a son of his 
own, he regarded almost as his own son. 
The plan for the invasion of Canada had 
been made without consulting Washington. 
When he heard of it he saw that, as Canada 
was then denuded of British troops, the ex- 
pedition would in all probability succeed, and 
LaFayette would gain great renown; but he 
saw with equal clearness that if an army 
under LaFayette's command and composed 
largely of French troops should cross the fron- 
tier, descend the Saint Lawrence, meet a 
French fleet at Quebec and capture that city, 



26 MILITARY SITUATION 

then French sovereignty would be restored 
on the American continent. Washington in- 
stantly wrote to the president of Congress 
one of those letters, of which there are so 
many in the twelve volumes of Sparks, the 
wisdom of which seems almost superhuman, 
in which he showed that if French troops en- 
tered the city of Quebec, they would prob- 
ably never leave there. This letter put a 
quietus on the proposed expedition to Can- 
ada. In the letter occurs this sentence, sel- 
dom quoted, but to my mind one of the most 
profound sayings of Washington, as true and 
as pertinent in this twentieth century as when 
it was written 136 years ago: "It is a maxim, 
founded on the universal experience of mankind, 
that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is 
bound by its interests; and no prudent states- 
man or politician will venture to depart from 
it." 

Now, can we be sure, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the interests of Great Britain and 
of the United States will always continue to 
be— as they undoubtedly are now, or were 



IN THE UNITED STATES 27 

until a few days ago — such that the existing 
friendship and even affection shall continue? 
Not long ago a cloud came on the horizon. 
Two ships, the Dacia and the Wilhelmina, 
recently belonging to Germany but now fly- 
ing the flag of the United States, sailed for 
Europe engaged in what we consider to be 
lawful commerce. They sailed, if the reports 
in the public press are correct, with the knowl- 
edge and approval of our government. And 
yet Great Britain courteously, but no less 
firmly and positively, informed our govern- 
ment prior to the date of sailing that it was 
her intention to seize these ships by force as 
they approached the coast of Europe. The 
ships are now on the ocean, and I do not 
know how the incident will terminate, but I 
need hardly say that if Great Britain should 
seize two ships flying the American flag, a 
situation of no little delicacy would arise. I 
shall say no more of this because under ex- 
isting circumstances the less said the better; 
but I think you ought to consider whether 
in case Great Britain and the United States 



28 MILITARY SITUATION 

lock horns on any such question which each 
party considers vital to its interests, and if 
neither side yields, then the friendship of a 
hundred years, of which we have recently 
talked so much and of which we are justly 
proud, might vanish overnight. 

We all hope and pray that our relations 
of peace and friendly competition with Great 
Britain may always continue; but we are not 
justified in building our plans on hopes. If 
England comes triumphant out of this war, 
she will not allow her subjects to be killed, 
and their property to be wrecked, in Mexico, 
and let it go with a flippant remark that her 
subjects went there to make money and they 
took the risks. That is not the way that 
England has treated her people, as they have 
spread to the four quarters of the globe. She 
will more probably say to us: "You restore 
order in Mexico, or we will." And if Eng- 
land goes to Mexico to restore order, she may 
not retire, as we did from Cuba. So that we 
will either have to eat our Monroe Doctrine 
or intervene in Mexico for an indefinite pe- 



IN THE UNITED STATES 29 

riod. Nor is this the only cloud that may 
come between our good friends in England 
and ourselves. If England comes out of this 
war victorious, she will be more than ever 
mistress of the seas; she will, with redoubled 
energy, seek to extend her commerce on every 
continent in order to recover the loss and 
damage of the war. We also are seeking to 
extend our commerce and to sell our manu- 
factured goods in every quarter of the globe. 
Therein, according to the judgment of our 
wisest men of affairs, lies the future prosper- 
ity of this country. Is there no chance that 
the two great nations may clash in this com- 
petition? Thanks to the skill of Hamilton 
Fish and William M. Evarts, loyally sup- 
ported by President Grant, in 1871, we arbi- 
trated the Alabama claims with entire satis- 
faction to both sides; later, in 1907, thanks 
to the genius and forensic ability of Elihu 
Root, we arbitrated the fishery disputes, which 
had more than once brought us to the verge 
of war during the hundred years that they 
had remained unsettled. But the skill of Jef- 



30 MILITARY SITUATION 

ferson, Madison, and Monroe, all ardent ad- 
vocates of peace and of the futility of prep- 
aration for war, were insufficient to keep us 
from going to war with England in 1812 over 
the question of the impressment of our sea- 
men. So that, looking at the history of Eng- 
land for the last 160 years, I think we are 
not justified in believing that the present 
happy relations between the two great Eng- 
lish-speaking peoples are so certain to con- 
tinue that it is not necessary to give any 
thought to what we should do in the un- 
happy contingency that they might be broken. 
It was Cromwell who said: "Put your trust 
in God but mind to keep your powder dry." 
That was a homely but sound maxim of your 
ancestors. We no longer have to keep our 
powder dry, because we keep it in a metallic 
case, but we do have to take equally prudent 
precautions. 

Next, is there no risk that Germany may 
some day attack us ? If she should come out 
victorious from this war — which seems hardly 
possible, and yet she has already accomplished 



IN THE UNITED STATES 31 

marvels of impossibility — Germany would 
probably not ask us to restore order in Mexico, 
but would calmly announce that she intended 
to restore order there herself and did not 
need our assistance in the matter. As ancil- 
lary to this undertaking she would promptly 
buy from Denmark the island of Saint 
Thomas, which has the finest harbor in the 
West Indies. For 45 years, since the first 
term of General Grant's administration, we 
have steadily refused to purchase it for our- 
selves and as steadily refused to allow any 
one else to buy it; although Denmark has 
been ready and anxious at every moment 
in that long period to sell. The adjacent 
island of Santa Cruz, which she owns, would 
be thrown in without extra expense, for both 
islands are of no use to Denmark, and the 
profits on their administration at the end of 
every year are written in red figures. Ger- 
many has hitherto respected our wish that 
these islands should not be acquired by any 
European nation; but, if she is victorious in 
this war, it needs no prophet to say that this 



32 MILITARY SITUATION 

wish of ours may no longer be respected. If 
Germany is defeated in this war, her wishes 
as to Mexico and the West Indian islands and 
the Panama Canal will have to be postponed; 
but let us not base any plans on the theory 
that Germany can be so crushed that she 
will never again undertake offensive military 
operations. The advocates of peace express 
the bloodthirsty wish that this may be ac- 
complished; that the war may continue until 
Germany is not only brought to her knees, 
but so devastated, maimed, and crippled that 
not for a hundred years can she again go to 
war; and they justify their wish by saying 
that only so can universal peace be ushered in 
and the United States of Europe established, 
with an International Supreme Court sitting 
constantly at The Hague to hear and decide 
their differences and an International Army 
to enforce its decrees. But, my friends, do 
not be deceived: that is not "in the womb of 
time"; it cannot be done. When the war is 
over Germany will still be the second naval 
power in the world, stronger than ourselves 



IN THE UNITED STATES 33 

in battleships, and possessed of an ocean- 
going commerce with a tonnage nearly five 
times as great as our own. In little more 
than one generation, from 1872 to 1914, Ger- 
many has built up her merchant marine from 
989,000 tons to 4,900,000 tons, an increase of 
fivefold. Germany possesses the only three 
ships in the world having a tonnage each 
exceeding 50,000 tons. The combined ton- 
nage of the Hamburg-American, North Ger- 
man Lloyd, and Hamburg South American 
lines is 2,311,000. The combined tonnage of 
the Cunard, White Star, British India, and 
Peninsular and Oriental lines is only 1,960,- 
000 tons. By far the greater part of the 
German tonnage has been created within the 
space of a single generation. The Germans 
manufacture ships of the very highest quality 
at about 60 per cent of what they cost us; 
they operate these ships at an expense of 
about 80 per cent of what we have to pay. 
So long as the scale of wages continues what 
it now is, and probably will continue to be, in 
this country, there is no ground to expect 



34 MILITARY SITUATION 

that we can ever rival Germany in the ocean- 
carrying trade. Even if during the present 
war England should succeed in practically 
destroying all of the existing German ships, 
neither England nor any other nation can 
destroy German efficiency, German stout- 
heartedness, German brains, and German in- 
dustrial skill. If her whole commercial fleet 
is wiped out, it will only be a few years be- 
fore German ships will again be seen on every 
one of the seven seas. In support of this 
we have only to consider how rapidly France 
recovered from the appalling disasters of 1870 
and the crushing financial burdens which 
were then laid upon her by her victorious 
opponent. We have only to consider the 
state of absolute desolation in which the 
South found itself in 1865, and the pros- 
perity which it had already regained less than 
10 years later. 

Now, what are the German ideas about the 
possibility of Germany's picking a quarrel 
with us and sending troops across the sea to 
settle it? Let me read you something from 



IN THE UNITED STATES 35 

a very interesting little book* published in 
Germany some years ago, the publication of 
which, so it is said, was suppressed at the 
outbreak of this war; but a translation was 
recently made from copies which escaped 
hither, and it has been published in New 
York within the last few months. Its author 
is or was a member of the German General 
Staff and the title of his book is "Operations 
Upon the Sea. ,, This is his opinion as to the 
possibility of operations against the United 
States. He says (p. 92) : 

"As a matter of fact, Germany is the only 
great power which is in a position to conquer 
the United States. England could, of course, 
carry out a successful attack upon the sea, 
but she would not be prepared to protect her 
Canadian provinces, with which the Amer- 
icans could compensate themselves for a total 
or crushing defeat on the sea. None of the 
other great powers can provide the necessary 
transport fleet to attempt an invasion/ ' 

* "Operations Upon the Sea. A Study." By Freiherr von 
Edelsheim, in the service of the German General Staff in 
1 901. Translated from the German. New York: The Out- 
door Press, 1 914. 



36 MILITARY SITUATION 

And again (p. 86) : 

"With that country, in particular, political 
friction, manifest in commercial aims, has not 
been lacking in recent years, and has, until 
now, been removed chiefly through acquies- 
cence on our part. However, as this sub- 
mission has its limit, the question arises as 
to what means we can develop to carry out 
our purpose with force in order to combat 
the encroachment of the United States upon 
our interests.* Our main factor here is our 

* Many people have expressed astonishment that the Ger- 
man Government allowed the publication of Bernhardi's 
book, which so accurately forecasted the events of last Au- 
gust, and similarly as to this book of von Edelsheim. The 
latter deals solely with a military problem, whereas Bern- 
hardi's "Next War" deals with many other than strictly 
military subjects; but as to military projects von Edels- 
heim's book is to sea operations what von Bernhardi's book 
is to land operations. The officers of our army and navy 
are forbidden to discuss such topics in public, either in speech 
or writing. How in the world did Germany allow such 
books to be published ? 

The answer is found in the difference in the environment. 
In Germany several thousand military books are published 
every year; in English-speaking countries several scores 
at the most. German officers are encouraged to discuss 
military topics, and they do not hesitate to face the facts 
and call a spade a spade. Moreover, it is probable that the 
German Chancellor was often in need of Socialist votes to 
pass his appropriation bills for the army and navy 3 and that 



IN THE UNITED STATES 37 

fleet. Our battle fleet has every prospect of 
victoriously defeating the forces of the United 
States, widely dispersed over the two oceans. 
It is certain that after the defeat of the United 
States fleet, the great extension of unprotected 
coast-line and [of the] powerful resources of 
that country would compel them to make 
peace." 

His little book is an elaboration of his ideas 
of how the operations should be conducted, 
in order, as he says, "to carry out our purpose 
with force"; and of an exhortation to the 
members of the General Staff and his other 
comrades in arms not to neglect this overseas 
problem in the study of the many problems 

it was necessary for them to be instructed as to the "en- 
croachments" of other nations, and to be convinced by mil- 
itary experts that they would get their money's worth if 
they voted for the expenditure. Finally, a possible psycho- 
logical explanation: When Bismarck represented Prussia 
in the Diet at Frankfort, he conceived the idea that his col- 
leagues who represented the other states in the North Ger- 
man Confederation conducted their negotiations by lying 
and deceit. Thereafter he invariably told the truth, and 
thereby outwitted them. The story is given by Busch, who 
was to Bismarck as Boswell to Johnson. Possibly Bismarck's 
disciples — not only the authors, but the Chancellors — acted on 
the same principle. 



38 MILITARY SITUATION 

with which they are charged, but to make 
their plans and to work out in time of peace 
all necessary preparations, so that when the 
transatlantic war begins it can be prosecuted 
with as much celerity as, let me say, the mo- 
bilization of August, 1914, and the advance 
through Belgium to the vicinity of Paris. I 
have no doubt that Freiherr von Edelsheim's 
advice has been carefully followed, that the 
project for a war with the United States, in 
successive units of, say, 240,000 men each, 
has all been made, docketed, and put away in 
the appropriate pigeonhole, in the office of the 
German General Staff at Berlin, until it shall be 
called for. I confess to an intense curiosity 
(which is not likely to be satisfied) to see this 
document. In the absence of that I shall 
later on give you a summary of so much of 
Baron von Edelsheim's plans as he has dis- 
closed in his most interesting little book. 

I dismiss all consideration of a "war" with 
Mexico. Circumstances may make it neces- 
sary for us to do some arduous, expensive, 
and difficult police work in that turbulent 



IN THE UNITED STATES 39 

country. If we have to do it, it will be as 
easily within our means as was the settle- 
ment of our dispute with Spain in 1898; and 
the result of pacifying and establishing stable 
government in that land of marvellous re- 
sources which has been distracted by revolu- 
tions throughout the hundred years since it 
declared its independence of Spain, will be 
worth far more than what it costs; but it 
would not be war in the sense of what we are 
now discussing. 

On the Pacific, however, there is a remote 
possibility of war— in my humble judgment, 
far more remote than the contingency of war 
on the Atlantic coast, and it will not happen 
except as a result of our own insolence, our 
own disregard of our treaties, or our own in- 
ability to compel the sovereign States which 
form the portion of our Union bordering on 
the Pacific Ocean to legislate in conformity 
to the treaties which the Federal Government 
has made. I reach this opinion, viz., that 
the possibility of war with Japan is in the 
highest degree remote, for various reasons. 



40 MILITARY SITUATION 

In the first place, Japan owes her entrance 
into the family of nations to us. All her 
statesmen, on all proper occasions, express 
their gratitude for this, and their belief that 
this gratitude and its resulting friendship will 
be perpetual. Some people doubt the sincer- 
ity of this, but I do not. In the second 
place, the Elder Statesmen who control the 
affairs of Japan are among the wisest of the 
men who guide the destinies of nations. They 
have no delusions. They are more con- 
cerned with actualities than with rhetoric; 
more interested in studying facts than in 
making phrases. They realize that while 
possibly in the beginning of the struggle they 
might have an advantage over us, the end 
of it would be disastrous to them. It would 
set them back where they were when Perry 
opened their doors by the treaty of March 
31, 1854. They are not willing that the 
enormous strides which they have made in 
shipping and foreign commerce and inland 
industry during the last twenty years, since 
they discharged with courteous thanks most 



IN THE UNITED STATES 41 

if not all of their foreign teachers, shall be 
jeopardized. They appreciate that as to us 
their resources and wealth are as dimes to 
dollars.* But, on the other hand, no prouder 
race exists on the face of the earth, no nation 
which has more venerable traditions of which 
it justly has the right to be proud. Their 
courtesy and tact in dealing with foreign na- 
tions lose nothing by comparison with those 
of the French, whose language is the language 
of diplomacy. Now, the Japanese people, 
whose influence in their government daily 
grows, as the influence of their statesmen by 
comparison relatively diminishes, understand 
that in our government the Constitution says 
that treaties made in pursuance thereof, 
and duly ratified by a two-thirds majority 
of the Senate, are the supreme law of the 
land; the people of Japan, as self-govern- 
ment increases, and as they study more 
and more the workings of other governments, 
cannot comprehend how, when a State, a 

* National wealth of the United States, $150,000,000,000; 
national wealth of Japan, $12,000,000,000, or 8 per cent, — 
World Almanac, 191 5. 



42 MILITARY SITUATION 

portion of the United States, enacts legisla- 
tion in contravention of such a treaty, all 
that the President of the United States can 
do about it is to send his Secretary of State 
out to make a speech to that legislature and 
entreat it not to enact such legislation; and 
still further, they cannot appreciate how a 
Secretary of State sent on such an errand 
should return with his errand a complete fail- 
ure. Nor do they think that it is their busi- 
ness to try to understand such relations be- 
tween a State and the United States of which 
it is a part. They simply stand on their 
treaty, as they have a right to; and they 
have stood there now for several years, with 
an exhibition of self-control, of dignity, and 
of confidence in the righteousness of their 
claim and an unshaken belief that we will 
make our word good, which may well be com- 
mended to our careful consideration. The 
half-educated politicians of California, when 
they think of the Japanese as "heathen," 
should open their Bibles, turn to II Corin- 
thians 3:6, and ponder carefully what Paul, 



IN THE UNITED STATES 43 

the greatest of all Christian teachers, when 
writing "to obviate the charge of vainglory," 
said: "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth 
life." The California legislators have tried 
to "beat" the treaty. Perhaps they have 
succeeded. If so, let them not imagine that 
Japan will let it go at that. Their statesmen 
insist, and they are within their rights, legal, 
equitable, and moral, in so insisting, that 
they shall be treated as we treat other great 
nations; and they have the ability, when all 
diplomatic methods have been exhausted, to 
compel us so to treat them. For it seems 
hardly conceivable, when the people of this 
country fully understand this proposition — 
as Elihu Root and James Brown Scott and 
Hamilton Holt understand it — that 95,000,- 
000 people will allow themselves to be dragged 
into a senseless and wrongful war at the 
behest of 5,000,000 people, who seem to be 
hopelessly wrong on this question. 

The only question which can make trouble 
between us and Japan is the question of how 
long her endurance will last, how long her 



44 MILITARY SITUATION 

self-control will continue. If war comes with 
Japan, it will be "made in America. ,, 

I do not mean by this that the attack will 
be made by us. If as a result of our supreme 
folly in dealing with Japan as we do not deal 
with other nations the Japanese shall be 
goaded into war with us regardless of its 
ultimate consequences to them, the first blow 
would probably be struck by Japan before 
any declaration of war; it would be dealt 
with a swiftness and a certainty of which our 
people have no conception, and according to 
a definite plan carefully prepared in advance. 
Three days will see their battleships in the 
Philippines, and ten days* in the Hawaiian 
Islands, unless our battleships meet and des- 
troy theirs on the way. Their ships would 
not attack Manila because the fortifications 
of Corregidor are impregnable. But there 
are no fortifications on Lingayen Bay on 
the north, Balayan Bay on the south, or 
Lamon Bay on the east. A landing at either 

* The distance from the Japanese naval station on the 
Island Sea to Lingayen Gulf is i ; 4oo nautical miles, and to 
Honolulu, 3,500 nautical miles. 



IN THE UNITED STATES 45 

of these points presents no difficulties, and 
once landed it is but a few days' march to 
the rear of Manila. The roads are excellent, 
as good as those of New York or Massachu- 
setts. I know about them because they have 
been built by my son, who is the Director of 
Public Works, and he has sent me many 
photographs of them (with the automobiles 
flying along just within the speed limit as 
they do with us) and of the graceful bridges 
of reinforced concrete which span the streams. 
Our flag will not come down on Corregidor, 
but Manila, Cebu, Iloilo, and the other prin- 
cipal cities would all be in possession of the 
enemy within 30 days after the declaration 
of war, if there was one, or the sailing of the 
Japanese battleships through Shimonoseki 
Straits, if there was none — unless we had a 
mobile army large enough to defeat the in- 
vading army; as a matter of fact, we have, 
according to the report of the Secretary of 
War, 9,600 men in the Philippines, and as a 
matter of opinion, if the Japanese ever attack 
us there they will do it with 100,000 men. 



46 MILITARY SITUATION 

They have ample tonnage of ships to carry 
that number. 

Similarly, there are excellent fortifications in 
some of the harbors of the Hawaiian Islands; 
but, also, there are landing-places where there 
are no fortifications and from which the cities 
can be attacked in the rear. Honolulu is 
much nearer to San Francisco (2,089 nautical 
miles) than to Kobe or Yokohama, so that 
perhaps we might reinforce our garrison of 
8,200 men (provided we have a mobile army) 
before the enemy could arrive. But in any 
event there will be a great naval battle and 
probably a great land battle before the fate of 
the Hawaiian Islands would be settled. 

So that, perhaps, when these facts become 
known to our people as clearly as they are 
now known to the Japanese people, we may 
think that it becomes us to treat the Japa- 
nese with the same politeness that they treat 
us and that we show to other nations. 

I shall say nothing about Alaska, with its 
thousands of miles of unprotected coast-line, 
its enormously valuable coal-mines, and its 



IN THE UNITED STATES 47 

great National Railway, the construction of 
which is about to be undertaken. We have, 
according to the report of the Secretary of 
War, exactly 862 men in Alaska. There are 
no fortifications on its coast. Nor shall I 
say anything about the 1,200 miles of coast- 
line of the 3 great Pacific States of Wash- 
ington, Oregon, and California. The princi- 
pal harbors are protected by strong, modern, 
up-to-date fortifications; but unless we have 
a mobile army superior to that of a possible 
invader these fortifications will not prevent 
a landing between harbors and the capture 
of one or more of the great cities by an attack 
from the rear. If by their ill-considered and 
short-sighted legislation the people of these 3 
States force their countrymen into an unnec- 
essary war with Japan they will be the chief 
sufferers. I shall not go into the details of 
these matters, which affect us more closely 
than anything that can happen at Manila or 
Honolulu. I have already said enough, I 
think, to show that it behooves us to treat 
Japan on the basis of the most-favored nation. 



48 MILITARY SITUATION 

That is the solemn obligation of our treaty. 
We are railing at others for breaking their 
treaties. Are we observing our own ? If not, 
then this proud and sensitive race, under re- 
peated provocations, may possibly work them- 
selves into a frame of mind in which they will 
prefer national death to national dishonor; 
and in the dying they may deal us a wound 
more deep than we now imagine. 



And now having stated, I fear at too great 
length, the possibilities, more or less remote, 
of attack from the only three nations whose 
attack would be serious, I want to say a few 
words about the immutability of man, or at 
least the approach to immutability involved 
in the fact that his nature changes with such 
fabulous slowness. And I speak of this be- 
cause man's nature is of fundamental impor- 
tance in considering whether there will be 
more wars in the near future or whether, as 



IN THE UNITED STATES 49 

a result of the present unprecedented conflict, 
universal peace is a possibility worthy of prac- 
tical consideration. Doubtless man's nature 
does slowly change, but only on the scale 
used by the Psalmist when he said that "a 
thousand years in the sight of the Lord are 
but as yesterday when it is passed, and as a 
watch in the night/ ' We hear much of 
"progress" in these days; but the human 
body has not improved in size nor in form 
since the days of Phidias; the human mind 
is certainly not more acute nor more pro- 
found than it was in the days of Aristotle; 
the human heart is much the same as it was 
in the days of Solomon and David, three 
thousand years ago; it has the same pas- 
sions, noble and ignoble, the same lofty as- 
pirations, the same frailties and backslidings. 
Man is now and ever has been, and I believe 
long will be, a fighting animal. There is 
great talk nowadays of arbitration, and un- 
doubtedly there are many differences which 
can be and have been wisely arbitrated; and, 
equally without doubt, there are many quar- 



50 MILITARY SITUATION 

rels between nations which cannot be arbi- 
trated. If the suggested United States of 
Europe can be established, I do not see how, 
man's nature being what it is, civil war 
can with certainty be prevented. The greatest 
United States which the world has ever known, 
the model on which the United States of 
Europe must be patterned, if it is ever to be, 
had been in successful and even splendid opera- 
tion for 72 years; it had its Supreme Court 
with well-defined powers and administered by 
jurists of unsurpassed abilities; its Constitu- 
tion required it to guarantee to every State a 
republican form of government; it maintained 
an army and a militia in order to fulfil its con- 
stitutional obligation to suppress rebellion, 
and to repress internal disorder in cases where 
the individual States were unable to perform 
this primary function of all government. And 
yet in these United States, whose government 
was rightfully claimed to be the last word in ad- 
ministration, the highest product of the human 
mind in that noblest of all arts, the art of gov- 
ernment, a Civil War broke out which proved 



IN THE UNITED STATES 51 

to be the greatest conflict of modern times 
prior to the war now raging in Europe, and 
which continued until at the end of four ter- 
rible years one party to the controversy was, 
as a government, absolutely annihilated. If 
that happened in "the best government on 
earth," administered by a race whose knowl- 
edge and experience of self-government goes 
back through the centuries of the Declara- 
tion of Independence, British Parliament, and 
Magna Charta to the Witenagemot which the 
Angles brought from the Rhine to Britain in 
the fifth century, how can a new and loosely 
formed confederation, composed of peoples 
who speak five different languages, who range 
the whole gamut of civilization from the high- 
est art and literature to the lowest depth of 
ignorance and backwardness, whose laws are 
drawn from entirely different roots of thought, 
and whose religions, among those of them 
who still have any religious belief at all, have 
nothing in common except a very diversified 
belief in Jesus Christ — how can such a loosely 
formed confederation expect to be immune 



52 MILITARY SITUATION 

from civil war? The suggestion is made that 
the nations shall disarm, except for an inter- 
national army which shall enforce the decrees 
of the court at The Hague. The futility of 
this is evident. In 1861 both the North and 
South were disarmed. Before the end of the 
year a million and a half were fighting in the 
ranks. 

No, gentlemen, it does not look as if this 
scheme of the United States of Europe had 
been thoroughly thought out. I fear it will 
not work; that it is an "iridescent dream." 

As to the ability and competence of man 
to decide such fundamental differences as 
have brought on this greatest of all conflicts: 
I, for one, do not undertake to pass judgment 
upon the motives of the nations now at war, 
nor to attempt to decide which of them is 
right and which of them is wrong in their con- 
tentions. I do not believe that it is within 
the scope of finite intelligence to decide such 
a deep-rooted controversy. But I do be- 
lieve that it is within the scope of Infinite 
Intelligence to pass upon the merits of the 



IN THE UNITED STATES 53 

dispute, and to decide it aright. There are 
some people old-fashioned and simple-minded 
enough — I am one of them — to believe that 
there is a God of Battles, who uses war as 
an agency to accomplish his beneficent pur- 
poses, and to settle disputes which man, un- 
aided, cannot settle. Where would we have 
been in a court of arbitration, if there had 
been one, in 1775, when we shot down the 
King's soldiers? And in 1776, when we de- 
clared our independence? Parliament had 
the right to tax us without representation, if 
it was foolish enough to do so. But courts 
of arbitration, like other courts, must deal 
with rights, as they exist in law or equity; 
such courts cannot take into consideration 
any "higher law," or any aspirations for free- 
dom. If we had appealed to a court of arbi- 
tration at that time, we should have been 
non-suited, and summarily thrown out of 
court. What carried us into war was sym- 
pathy with Patrick Henry's declaration: 
" Give me liberty or give me death !" Courts 
of arbitration do not take cognizance of any 



54 MILITARY SITUATION 

such appeals. If our quarrel with our kins- 
folk in Great Britain had been arbitrated, 
we should surely have lost, and we would 
to-day be British colonies like Canada and 
Australia. Does any one seriously claim that 
that would be better than our present status, 
or that the struggle of the eight long years 
of the Revolution was not worth all that it 
cost in blood and treasure ? 

Similarly, in 1861, if there had been a 
Hague Court and the North and the South 
had gone there to plead their differences, the 
North would have said: We are opposed to 
the extension of slavery; and the South would 
have answered: That issue has already been 
settled in the Dred Scott case by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. The North 
would have said: We are in favor of the main- 
tenance of the Union and of compelling States 
to remain in the Union against their will; the 
South would have replied: Read your Con- 
stitution; show us any article in it which 
authorizes you to compel us to stay in the 
Union when we want to go out; as wit- 



IN THE UNITED STATES 55 

nesses, we cite Madison, who was so largely 
instrumental in drawing up the Constitution, 
and Jefferson, who took so prominent a part 
in putting it into operation; does any one 
know better than they what the Constitution 
means ? And what did they say about it in 
1798? 

Does any rational man believe that the 
North would have won its case in such an 
arbitration? The question answers itself. 
But in the terrible war which followed, the 
North did win its case; and the South is now 
as enthusiastic as the North in acquiescing 
in the decision made by the dread arbitra- 
ment of war. 

Again, in 1898 the Congress of the United 
States passed, without a dissenting voice, a 
joint resolution reading as follows: "The Gov- 
ernment of the United States does hereby 
demand, that the Government of Spain at 
once relinquish its authority and government 
in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land 
and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban wa- 
ters." Suppose we had sent our most em- 



56 MILITARY SITUATION 

inent jurists to The Hague and had asked 
for a decree that the international police 
force be sent to Cuba to enforce this demand, 
what would the great lawyers of England, 
France, Germany, Russia, and other coun- 
tries, sitting in the beautiful Palace of Peace, 
have said to our plea ? They must of neces- 
sity have decided that our plea was prepos- 
terous. In that case Cuba, Porto Rico, and 
the Philippines would have continued under 
Spanish misgovernment, and the colonial 
system of Spain would still be tottering in 
its decrepitude. Does any one believe that 
that would have been a better solution than 
the solution which was brought about by 
war, under which the peoples in these islands 
are now well advanced on the high road of 
self-government, prosperity, and happiness? 
And as for the losses in battle during those 
brief but all-important one hundred days, 
they were no greater than the number killed 
and injured on our own railroads during the 
same period. 
Turn again to 1846. If ever there was a 



IN THE UNITED STATES 57 

war conceived in sin and born in iniquity, it 
was the war with Mexico. If we had tried 
to arbitrate this, we would not have had a 
leg to stand on; and yet through the work- 
ings of an inscrutable and Divine Providence, 
this wicked war resulted in bringing good 
government throughout a territory of almost 
untold wealth, about 1,000,000 square miles 
in extent, now inhabited by nearly 10,000,000 
of contented people; whereas but for the 
war this vast territory would now be in a 
state of anarchy and chaos, similar to that 
which exists to-day in the contiguous states 
of Chihuahua and Sonora. 

Finally, it is possible, though by no means 
certain, and, in fact, quite doubtful, that if we 
had arbitrated our quarrel with Great Britain 
in 1812 we might have won our case; but 
it was not our grievances against Great Britain 
— the impressment of our seamen, the occu- 
pation of our western posts, and the inter- 
ference with our commerce through paper 
blockades and preposterous "Orders-in-Coun- 
cil" — just as these grievances undoubtedly 



58 MILITARY SITUATION 

were, which drove us into" war. It was the 
fiery speech of young Henry Clay on his 
accession to the Senate at the age of 34, 
by which he swept Madison, an ardent ad- 
vocate of peace, and the whole country off 
their feet, by stating that we had a right to 
demand that Great Britain should relinquish 
her sovereignty over any and all parts of this 
continent; that our citizen soldiers would 
cross the frontier at Niagara and Plattsburg, 
march down the Saint Lawrence to Quebec, 
brushing aside the Canadians, and the few 
soldiers which in the agony of her conflict 
with Napoleon Great Britain could then send 
to Canada, and at Quebec we would dictate 
a peace which would forever dispose of any 
pretensions of Great Britain to exercise au- 
thority on this continent. Henry Clay proved 
a bad prophet; and, in the treaty which he 
himself signed at Ghent 100 years ago last 
month, not only did Great Britain retain 
her sovereignty in Canada, which she still 
maintains, but not one of the things for 
which we went to war was so much as men- 



IN THE UNITED STATES 59 

tioned in the treaty. Nevertheless, Great 
Britain did at an early day evacuate our 
posts, and she never again attempted to im- 
press our seamen or to issue "Orders-in-Coun- 
cil" designed to destroy our foreign com- 
merce. The result of the War of 1812 was 
to give us commercial freedom, as the Revo- 
lution had given us political freedom. 



In addition to the questions of arbitration, 
and of man's nature as affecting the prob- 
ability of war, I desire for a moment to call 
your attention to the relative advantages for 
its inhabitants of a great and powerful na- 
tion as compared with a small nation which 
cannot indulge in the extravagance of great 
armaments. 

A very able book was written a few years 
ago by Norman Angell called, "The Great 
Illusion. " Thousands of copies of it have 
been sold, it has been translated into several 
foreign languages, and must have had, as 



60 MILITARY SITUATION 

it deserved, several million readers. It was 
written from the economic standpoint, and 
was intended to prove that war does not termi- 
nate the dispute; that private property still 
exists in a conquered province; that the pay- 
ment of the huge indemnity by France to 
Germany was of benefit to France rather 
than to Germany, because Germany spent 
the money in wasteful extravagance which 
brought on a financial panic, whereas France 
by enforced economy and her traditional 
thrift soon got the money back in payment for 
the products of her industry; that not many 
years later France was able to loan huge 
sums to Germany and in the Moroccan crisis 
she called her German loans and forced Ger- 
many to settle that question in accordance 
with her views. In support of his theory, 
which many men of the first rank in finance 
and business have pronounced unanswerable, 
he quoted the prices of national securities 
and cited the fact, which at that time was 
indisputable, that the bonds of the smaller 
countries like Switzerland and Denmark and 



IN THE UNITED STATES 61 

Sweden which were not wasting their re- 
sources in ruinous armaments commanded a 
far higher price in the markets of the world 
than those of Germany, France, or England. 
He argued that the might and power of these 
nations created an illusion; and, in particular, 
he cited the case of Belgium, whose bonds then 
sold at a higher price than those of any other 
nation in Europe. He referred to this hive of 
industry, whose people lived contentedly with- 
out a great army and with practically no 
navy, the neutrality of their state and the 
stability of their government guaranteed by 
the three great nations, and he proved to his 
own satisfaction, and that of thousands of 
readers, that the condition of the Belgian, 
whose government did not aspire to rule one- 
sixth or one-fourth of the people of the world 
and did not have to maintain the great na- 
vies and armies which are necessary to such 
a position, was far happier in every way than 
that of the groaning taxpayer in the larger 
countries. 
His whole argument rested on the corner- 



62 MILITARY SITUATION 

stone of the inviolability of treaties, and alas ! 
when in August the neutrality treaties be- 
came mere scraps of paper and were thrown 
to the wind in what were supposed to be the 
exigencies of a great power, at the beginning 
of its campaign, his whole thesis fell to the 
ground like a house of cards. There are no 
quotations now on Belgian bonds, except such 
as are guaranteed by England; and private 
property in Belgium has almost ceased to exist, 
burned up and battered down by a mighty 
conqueror. 

Following the fashion of the day, Mr. An- 
gell invented a phrase in order to attract at- 
tention to his thoughts: "The Great Illu- 
sion." The sad fact is that Mr. Angell was 
himself the victim of an illusion, to wit: that 
treaties are sacred and inviolable. Few wars 
have been fought that did not involve the 
violation of antecedent treaties. 

I trust that I have given you some ground 
to doubt whether this much- vaunted arbitra- 
tion is the cure-all that its friends claim; 



IN THE UNITED STATES 63 

whether the fortune of being part of a small 
neutralized state is as good as it was thought 
to be; and — man's nature being substan- 
tially what it has been for at least 3,000 
years, and what it will long continue to be 
— whether war is, or soon will be, a thing 
of the past. We have, therefore, a "military 
situation ,, in these United States, to wit: 
It is conceivable that we may be attacked by 
one, or possibly by two, of three great powers. 
In case through their fault or through ours 
— and we are not always or inevitably free 
from fault in our dealings with other nations 
— a conflict should arise, how would they go 
about it, and what would or should we do 
to repel the attack and successfully maintain 
our side of the controversy? 

The issue, in the first instance, would de- 
pend upon the control of the sea. Great 
Britain now maintains a navy of size and 
force equal to that of any other two nations 
combined, Germany and the United States 
included. In my judgment this condition 
will continue during the longest life of the 



64 MILITARY SITUATION 

youngest of children now born. When Eng- 
land ceases to maintain such a navy her name 
will no longer be England, but some synonym 
for Venice, Spain, or Holland, each of which 
in turn was at one time mistress of the seas. 
We are no longer the second naval power, but 
the third; and if the views of the arbitration- 
ists prevail, we shall soon be the fourth or 
fifth. In any event, we cannot expect to 
have a larger navy than Germany. If, in 
some controversy about the Panama Canal 
or our foreign commerce, the self-interest of 
Great Britain and the self-interest of Germany 
should coincide, and should be adverse to the 
self-interest of the United States, then these 
two nations would unite to coerce us; they 
would again be allies as they were under 
Chatham and under his great son, the younger 
Pitt. In that event we should be opposed by 
a naval force more than three times as great 
as our own, and should be hopelessly out- 
classed. The allies would have no trouble 
in crossing the ocean and selecting such a 
point for landing as the General Staffs of the 



IN THE UNITED STATES 65 

two countries should decide to be most fa- 
vorable to their plans. If Great Britain 
alone should be our antagonist in a conflict 
which the resources of diplomacy and arbitra- 
tion could not prevent, there would be prac- 
tically the same result, for I cannot conceive 
that we shall ever have a navy as large as 
Great Britain must have. If Germany alone 
should attack us, we might be inferior at 
sea; in any event the best we could hope for 
would be to fight the German navy on equal 
terms. We might be defeated in such an 
engagement; and, if we were victorious, we 
would be so crippled that the control of the 
sea would not be in our hands, even if it was 
not in the hands of the Germans. 

Until this war no German battleship had, 
so far as I know, been engaged in battle. The 
German navy has no splendid traditions such 
as the British navy has in Trafalgar, the Nile, 
Copenhagen, and Saint Vincent's, no names 
of great naval commanders on the pages of 
its history like those of Nelson, Jervis, Howe, 
Collingwood, Keppel, and Rodney. But in 



66 MILITARY SITUATION 

this, Germany's first naval war, she has set 
a new record in the feats of submarines and 
cruisers; and in the battles of the south Pa- 
cific, the south Atlantic, and the North Sea 
she has shown that she is no mean antagonist 
for England. The natives of the Baltic and 
North Sea provinces have sailed the seas for 
centuries; they are good seamen in every 
sense of the word. The great commercial 
ships of Germany are navigated with a skill, 
and commanded with a discipline, not excelled 
by any other nation in the world. If any one 
thinks that the Germans cannot fight on the 
sea as well as they do on the land, he makes a 
great mistake. 

I assume, therefore, that if the Germans 
ever attempt to cross the Atlantic with an 
army, they will succeed. Will they be able 
to land? First, let me correct, or endeavor 
to correct, a popular error in regard to the 
function performed by the modern fortifica- 
tions which, thanks to the sound judgment 
and wise advice of Samuel J. Tilden, now 
protect all our great cities. They have been 



IN THE UNITED STATES 67 

built at a cost of nearly $160,000,000, and have 
been more than 20 years in the building. 
They do adequately serve their purpose of 
protecting these great cities — your own among 
them — from attack by sea. Without them, 
the battleships of any foreign nation could 
approach the harbor of Portland or any other 
harbor, send their torpedo-boats ahead to 
sweep the channels clear of mines, as the Coast 
Survey vessels now sweep the harbors to find 
submerged rocks, and forthwith capture the 
city without any loss to themselves. These 
fortifications being in existence, armed with 
the most modern cannon, and manned by a 
sufficient number of skilled gunners, this thing 
cannot be done. But from Portland to Ports- 
mouth there is a stretch of about 50 miles in 
which there are no fortifications; from Ports- 
mouth to Boston, a similar stretch; from Bos- 
ton around to Newport, a still longer piece of 
unfortified coast; from Montauk Point to 
Coney Island and from Sandy Hook to Cape 
May, similar stretches of sandy beach, each 
more than 100 miles in length, in which there 



68 MILITARY SITUATION 

are no fortifications, and no possibility of put- 
ting on these long sand strips any guns of 
size to match those of battleships. The near- 
est city in the United States to the mouth of 
the Kiel Canal is your own city of Portland. 
Suppose that the German General Staff should 
decide that, all things considered, Portland 
would be the best place to attack in the first 
instance with a view to establishing a naval 
base in your fine and capacious harbor. They 
would not come to Portland direct, but would 
go, say, to Kennebunkport, where last sum- 
mer I have seen the sea as calm as the Great 
Lakes; land there, quickly seize the rail- 
roads at Kennebunk, West Kennebunk, and 
Sanford so as to prevent any United States 
troops from coming from Boston, and then 
march down the fine automobile road — less 
than a 2 days' march — attack Portland from 
the rear, capture it, and seize your prin- 
cipal citizens as hostages for the payment 
of a large indemnity; as was recently done 
in Brussels and other Belgian cities. Would 
not that be an interesting "military situa- 



IN THE UNITED STATES 69 

tion " ? Some people may think that it would 
be difficult to land from the open ocean on 
an open beach. Listen to what our friend 
von Edelsheim has to say on that subject 
(p. 62): "Military history shows that an at- 
tempt to prevent a really bold landing is 
never successful. ,, When I first read this 
dictum I was disposed to question its ac- 
curacy, but in looking back at the list of 
overseas expeditions during the last 140 years 
I can find no case which disproves his state- 
ment. In the days of sailing-ships, Howe 
landed on Long Island in 1776, Napoleon 
landed in Egypt in 1778, and Scott landed 
at Vera Cruz in 1847. In the days of steam, 
the English, French, and Sardinians landed 
in the Crimea in 1854, the troops of the 
United States landed on Cuba, Porto Rico, 
and the Philippines in 1898, the allies landed 
at Taku in 1900; and there have been various 
minor landings during the last 140 years. 
I do not believe that von Edelsheim's dogma 
can be successfully disputed. 
Let me at once, however, allay your ap- 



70 MILITARY SITUATION 

prehensions by saying that I do not believe 
that the German General Staff would select 
Portland as their point of attack. I believe 
that they would instantly strike at the vitals 
of our trade, commerce, industrial and finan- 
cial system — that is, at New York. Pending 
an inspection of the overseas project — which, 
as I have previously said, is doubtless quietly 
reposing, docketed and indexed, in its proper 
pigeonhole in the office of the General Staff 
in Berlin — I venture to suggest that this is 
the plan which would probably be adopted: 
viz., a fleet of transports composed of ships 
not less than 10,000 nor more than 50,000 
tons in size, with speed of not less than 18 
knots, properly escorted by battleships and 
scout cruisers, and carrying about 15 divi- 
sions — say, 240,000 infantry, with the proper 
complement of artillery, cavalry, and engi- 
neers — and having on the decks of these 
ships an ample supply of aeroplanes, would 
sail from Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, Hamburg, 
Gluckstadt, Emden, and Kiel, and in about 
10 days — longer, perhaps, if there was a great 



IN THE UNITED STATES 71 

naval battle on the way — would arrive off the 
Long Island coast somewhere between Mon- 
tauk Point and Coney Island, and probably 
quite near those beautiful houses where some 
of my dearest friends live at Southampton. 
The ground would be reconnoitred by the 
aeroplanes, and then the torpedo-boats, the 
scout cruisers, and in the background the 
battleships, would close in toward the shore 
and with their guns protect the landing. 
Once landed, the march would begin for Long 
Island City; and unless we had a mobile army 
of at least equal strength, equally trained, 
and commanded by equally skilful officers, 
this march would not take more than 4 
days. Arrived in the boroughs of Queens and 
Brooklyn, it is possible that our people would 
destroy those splendid bridges crossing the 
East River, which have been constructed at 
an expense of $89,400,000, and which are the 
admiration of engineers the world over.* 



* Brooklyn Bridge, $22,400,000; Manhattan Bridge, $26,- 
000,000; Williamsburg Bridge, $23,100,000; Queensboro 
Bridge, $17,900,000. — World Almanac, 1914. 



72 MILITARY SITUATION 

If the bridges should be destroyed, the pas- 
sage over to Manhattan would be delayed, but 
not stopped. There are no forts between 
Staten Island and Fort Schuyler (where the 
East River joins Long Island Sound), a dis- 
tance of more than 20 miles, nor is it 
possible to have any forts in this, the most 
densely populated spot on the face of the 
globe. The passage of the East River would 
present no great difficulties; and, once in Man- 
hattan, discreet officers would at once be sent 
to find John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, 
J. P. Morgan, George F. Baker, Jacob H. 
Schiff, Frank A. Vanderlip, W. K. Vander- 
bilt, Henry C. Frick, Vincent Astor, and 
Harry Payne Whitney; or, if these men were 
no longer living, they would seek those who, at 
the time of the invasion, would occupy the 
commanding position in the world of affairs 
which these gentlemen now fill. These ten men 
would be taken in military automobiles to the 
headquarters of the commanding general and 
there placed in close confinement until they 
signed a bond, conditioned upon the payment, 



IN THE UNITED STATES 73 

either by the city of New York or by the 
United States, or by both, of an indemnity 
of not less than $5,000,000,000; say, about 
twice the cost of our Civil War, exclusive of 
pensions. Would they sign it? Most assur- 
edly they would. They are all astute men 
of affairs, and it would be bad business for 
them to do anything else. The indemnity of 
$5,000,000,000 compared with the resources 
of the United States at the present time 
would not be excessive, as compared with the 
indemnity of $1,000,000,000 which France 
was compelled to pay in 1871.* And yet, 
to the last day of his life, Bismarck re- 
gretted that he had not made Thiers sign 
for more. 

You all know the story of dear old Bliicher, 
that hot-headed but simple-minded old man 
(he was then 73 years old) who helped 
Wellington to win the battle of Waterloo. 
After Napoleon had been sent to Saint Hel- 

* According to Mulhall, the national wealth of France in 
1870 was $34,652,000,000. The World Almanac for 1915 
gives the national wealth of the United States at $150,000,- 
000,000. 



74 MILITARY SITUATION 

ena, Blucher came to England as the guest 
of the nation, and in accordance with the 
usual custom he was given the freedom of 
the City of London in a gold box and invited 
to a dinner at the Mansion House. He rode 
in the carriage with Wellington along the old 
established route from Westminster, past Traf- 
algar Square, where the Nelson column and 
Landseer's splendid lions were not yet in place, 
but where the pathetic statue of Charles I had 
already been erected — a statue as pathetic 
as the fate of poor Charles himself — then on 
through the Strand, past Somerset House, 
the Temple and the Inns of Court, with all 
their wealth of historical associations, to 
Temple Bar — where not even the Sovereign 
of England might pass without the consent 
of the Lord Mayor — on through Fleet Street, 
redolent with the memories of John- 
son, up Ludgate Hill and past Saint Paul's, 
whose splendid dome and massive founda- 
tions were as impressive then as now; around 
Saint Paul's churchyard, through Cheapside 
and the Poultry to Mansion House Square. 



IN THE UNITED STATES 75 

As they rode along through the applauding 
multitudes which lined the streets, doubtless 
Wellington — although there was not much of 
the sentimental in his make-up — pointed out 
to Bliicher the historical memories and the 
associations of these ancient thoroughfares. 
All this made no impression upon Bliicher; 
but when he arrived in sight of the Bank of 
England, the Stock Exchange, and the Man- 
sion House, he was filled with awe at the vi- 
sions of such wealth; his face lighted up as 
he turned to Wellington and exclaimed: " Was 
fur Plunder!" — What a place for loot !* And 
yet the entire value of all London from the 
Abbey to the Bank, in 1815, was less than 
the value of the property, real and personal, 
fixed and incorporeal, within half a mile of 
the United States subtreasury on Manhattan 
Island. 

* It is so many years since I first heard this story that I 
cannot remember its origin. I do not vouch for its accuracy, 
but I have heard it so many times, told by men who had 
passed much of their life in London, and it so accords with 
Blucher's well-known character and early life, that I can- 
net but believe that it has some foundation in fact. At all 
events e ben trovato. 



76 MILITARY SITUATION 

Yes, you can be very sure that the ten hos- 
tages would sign the bond.* 

I fancy I hear some one say under his 
breath: What a fantastic picture ! as baseless 
as the fabric of a dream. No ! if we are not 
adequately prepared for defense it is no more 
fantastic than the fate of Belgium, no more 
baseless than the destruction of Louvain. 
Let us consider for a moment what actually 
happened to Belgium. German mobiliza- 
tion began on August 1, German troops en- 
tered Belgium on August 3, Liege was cap- 
tured on August 7, the Germans entered 
Brussels on August 20, they crossed the 
French frontier on August 23, Louvain was 
destroyed on August 26, and on September 
1 the German army, having swept across Bel- 
gium, was within 25 miles of Paris. In just 

* I cannot help wondering — and I hope I may say it without 
giving offense to Mr. Carnegie, for whom I have profound 
regard and who, unlike Sidney Smith's friend, needs no sur- 
gical operation to get a joke into his head — whether the canny 
Scot, should he be alive at the time of the invasion and be 
one of the ten, as he took his pen in hand to affix his sig- 
nature to the bond, would still hold fast to the doctrine which 
he has enunciated in a recent interview, that " War never set- 
tles anything." 



IN THE UNITED STATES 77 

31 days, therefore, out of a state of profound 
peace, Belgium had been practically des- 
troyed. How did this catastrophe happen? 
Simply because Belgium is only about one- 
tenth of Germany in size and resources; and 
her allies were not sufficiently prepared to 
come to her relief in time to save her from 
destruction. You will say that this could 
not happen to us, because of our immense 
resources and because of the ocean which 
separates us from the nations of Europe. As 
to the first, there is no easier mark than a 
rich nation unprepared for defense. As to 
the second, the ocean was a great barrier in 
the days of sailing-ships, but its value as a 
bulwark of defense has greatly diminished 
with the advent of steam and electricity. 
The German troops were across the Belgian 
frontier in 2 days; the German transports 
could not reach Long Island in less than 10 
or 12 days. That is the only difference. 
The mobilization on the Belgian frontier 
took only 48 hours; the mobilization in the 
Baltic and North Sea harbors would take no 



78 MILITARY SITUATION 

longer. Our interesting friend, von Edels- 
heim, has figured it all out in a general way 
and doubtless his comrades of .the General 
Staff have elaborated it in greater detail. 
Let me again read you a few extracts from 
his book. On page 34, speaking of the Ger- 
man harbors, he says: "Bremerhaven is by 
far the best. In every respect it would take 
first place for embarkation, because of its 
extensive wharves. From this point 2 or 
more divisions could be shipped daily without 
difficulty. Cuxhaven is not so well situated, 
but its connection with Hamburg is impor- 
tant. If it were brought up to full develop- 
ment it could take care of 2 divisions a 
day, which Hamburg could well supply. 
Gluckstadt is an especially important base 
because most of our live-stock exporting busi- 
ness is carried on there. It is recommended 
that a short double-track railroad be built 
from Elmshorn to Gluckstadt, making a con- 
nection with the reserve-corps frontier. In 
Gluckstadt 1 infantry division and part of 
a cavalry division can be shipped [daily]. ,, 



IN THE UNITED STATES 79 

In another part of his book he states the 
well-known fact that a German infantry 
division numbers 16,000 men. You will see, 
therefore, that he has figured it out that 6 
divisions, 96,000 men, can be embarked in 
one day, or 240,000 men in two and a half 
days. I do not believe that our General 
Staff in Washington or any other military 
experts who are familiar with the German 
army will dispute the accuracy of his compu- 
tation. In another part of his book (p. 55) 
he has given at length his reasons for be- 
lieving that 10 infantry divisions and 1 
cavalry division can be despatched in 4 
days. The number of ships and tonnage 
space for artillery and cavalry horses are 
all set forth. For instance (p. 50): "Three 
ships would accommodate 2 cavalry bri- 
gades.' ' There would be no lack of ships. 
The fleet of the Hamburg line alone measures 
1,168,000 tons, and of the North German 
Lloyd 795,000 tons. And if these are not 
enough, the harbors of Amsterdam, Rotter- 
dam, Antwerp, and Copenhagen are close at 



80 MILITARY SITUATION 

hand; and the events of last August do not 
warrant us in believing that any question of 
neutrality would prevent the seizure, if need 
be, of the shipping that crowds their docks. 
Euphemistically von Edelsheim uses the fol- 
lowing language (p. 37) : 

"The problem of ship control would at 
best fall to the loading commission, which 
should be settled upon as an established au- 
thority to make a comprehensive survey and 
appraise the German steamers for military 
transporting. This commission should also 
list the foreign-owned steamers which might be 
available in the harbors for use in emergencies. 
Through close commercial relations this control 
can be extended to neighboring foreign ports 
{Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Copenhagen), to the 
end that we might charter several large foreign 
steamers."* 

If the neutral owners did not wish to char- 
ter their steamers, the Kaiser's dreadnoughts 
would be close at hand to persuade them. 
But, as a matter of fact, this would not be 

* The italics are mine. 



IN THE UNITED STATES 81 

necessary, for Germany has an ample number 
of ships of her own available at any time to 
embark 240,000 infantry, with the correspond- 
ing numbers of artillery, cavalry, and engi- 
neers, and their necessary munitions, stores, 
and provision?. Edelsheim again has it all 
figured out (p. 47) : 

"The troop transport capacity of a ship 
has heretofore been calculated by the ship's 
tonnage, that is, 60 per cent of the ship's ca- 
pacity is net ton loading-space. The neces- 
sary space for us, for a long sea voyage, is 
set at 2 tons for each man, and 6 to 
7 tons for each horse. The English and 
Russian estimates are about the same. But 
the English transports to Cape Town accom- 
modated a larger number of troops than was 
thought possible, and the American trans- 
ports to Cuba were increased by one-third/' 

On this basis the 15 divisions, num- 
bering 240,000 infantry, would require 480,- 
000 net tons, or 800,000 tons of ship's capac- 
ity, and the accompanying artillery, cavalry, 
stores, and provisions would take as much 



82 MILITARY SITUATION 

more; or, in all, ships of a gross capacity of 
1,600,000 tons. This is less than the ton- 
nage of the Hamburg-American and North 
German Lloyd lines; but, in addition to these 
two lines, the tonnage of the other lines under 
the German flag is nearly three times as 
great, the total of German tonnage as given 
in the statistical books for 1914 being 4,892,- 
410. I can personally testify that his esti- 
mate of 1 man for every 2 tons net is 
substantially correct; for in 1898 I com- 
manded the second expedition to the Philip- 
pines, which consisted of the 10th Pennsyl- 
vania, 1st Nebraska, and 1st Colorado, Vol- 
unteers, the 18th and 23d Infantry of the 
regular army, 2 batteries of field-artillery from 
Utah, and half a company of regular en- 
gineers, numbering in all about 4,800 men. 
We had four transports — improvised from 
mail-steamers plying on the Pacific — the larg- 
est of which had a gross tonnage of 5,000 and 
the smallest 1,500. The total tonnage was 
about 12,500. Sixty per cent of this is 7,500 
tons. With 4,800 men on board we were 



IN THE UNITED STATES 83 

stowed at the rate of about 1 man for each 
\y 2 net tons; and we were not uncomfortably 
crowded as we slowly steamed across the Pa- 
cific in echelon formation at 8 cable-lengths, 
our speed governed by the speed of the slowest 
ship, which was only 9 knots, so that we were 
32 days covering the 7,000 or more nautical 
miles from San Francisco to Manila Bay. If 
we, in our state of almost total unpreparedness 
in 1898, could raise a volunteer army, impro- 
vise transports from ships which were not (as 
are those of Germany) built with special ref- 
erence to the transport of troops and liable 
under their subsidy agreements to be taken 
instantly when needed as transports, cross a 
continent of 3,000 miles by rail, traverse 
7,000 nautical miles of ocean, and make a 
successful landing, under the protection of 
the navy's guns, within a short distance of 
the Spanish forts and trenches — all within 
the space of 82 days from the declaration 
of war; and within 27 days thereafter, under 
the protection of 146 guns on Dewey's squad- 
ron, assault and capture an army, which 



84 MILITARY SITUATION 

though small in numbers was larger than that 
of the assailants, and with it the capital of 
the Spanish dominions in the Far East, 
thereby terminating forever the Spanish co- 
lonial system in the Orient which had existed 
for more than 300 years— if, I say, we, al- 
most ludicrously unready for war in 1898, 
could do this, is it to be supposed that Ger- 
many, with her plans studied out long in ad- 
vance, with her enormous tonnage of fast 
ships, her troops in instant readiness, with 
no continent to cross and an ocean of barely 
3,000 miles instead of 7,000 separating her 
from her opponent — is it to be supposed, I 
say, that Germany could not bring 240,000 
infantry with the corresponding numbers of 
artillery and cavalry to our shores in from 
12 to 15 days? No soldier who has studied 
the question will deny that Germany can do 
this; and, as I have previously pointed out, 
all history shows that the landing could not 
be prevented. 

I fancy some one asking me: Do you really 
and seriously believe that Germany could ac- 



IN THE UNITED STATES 85 

tually capture New York in the manner you 
have described? And I answer: No, I do not. 
But the only reason why I do not believe it 
is because I am confident that the people of 
this country, with their strong common sense, 
when they understand this proposition, will 
see to it that their representatives in Congress 
provide a mobile army of sufficient size, suf- 
ficiently trained, with an adequate reserve, 
and with a proper number of highly educated 
officers; and that we shall have an abundance 
of scout aeroplanes which can constantly 
reconnoitre the ocean within a range of at 
least 200 miles from the coast so as to give 
warning of the enemy's approach. With our 
admirable railway system we could concen- 
trate our mobile army — if we had one — op- 
posite the point selected for the landing. And 
I should expect this mobile army — if we 
had one — to attack the invading army as 
soon as the latter passed out of the range of 
the guns on its ships, defeat it, and drive it 
back in disorder to within the range of these 
guns, and with no alternative save a hasty 



86 MILITARY SITUATION 

re-embarkation under their protection, before 
a storm came up to disperse the fleet. And 
so the whole expedition would end in failure 
— like the failure to capture Paris on or be- 
fore August 26. If these things did not hap- 
pen — if we did not have a mobile army, if 
that army did not defeat the invading army 
as soon as it landed — then the capture of New 
York and the levy of a colossal indemnity 
would be as certain as any event in the future. 
It is proper, however, to point out — and 
this is the whole purpose of my address — that 
we do not at this moment possess such a mo- 
bile army. We have no reserve, we have an 
insufficient number of highly educated of- 
ficers. The General Staff of the army has 
asked for these things year after year, with- 
out serious attention being paid to its recom- 
mendations and advice. The Secretary of 
War in his last annual report — a document 
of rare sanity, calmness, close reasoning, and 
an adequate appreciation of the actual facts 
— has stated what is necessary to make a 
start in the right direction. I am leaving 



IN THE UNITED STATES 87 

with you a number of these reports, and I 
beg you to read them with as much care as 
you study the balance-sheets of your business. 
If his advice is disregarded too long, your bal- 
ance-sheets may not be worth the studying. 
His programme is a modest one. 

The Secretary says (p. 7): "The Regular 
Army of the United States on June 30, 1914, 
consisted of 4,701 officers and 87,781 men 
(including quartermaster corps, 3,809, and 
hospital corps, 4,055). Of these, 758 officers 
and 17,901 men belong to the coast artillery, 
and are therefore practically stationary in 
coast defenses; 1,008 officers and 18,434 men 
belong to the staff, technical and noncombat- 
ant branches of the army, including recruits 
and men engaged in recruiting. This leaves 
the army which can be moved from place to 
place — that is, the mobile army, so called — 
composed of 2,935 officers and 51,446 men." 

He goes on further to show that we had, 
on June 30, 1914, in the Philippines, 9,600 
men; in the Hawaiian Islands, 8,200 men; in 
the Canal Zone, 2,200 men; in China, Alaska, 



88 MILITARY SITUATION 

and Porto Rico, 2,400 men, and in Vera 
Cruz, 4,100 men; or in all, 26,500 men on 
service outside of the continental limits of 
the United States. Of these about 4,000 be- 
long to the coast artillery, and 22,500 to the 
mobile army. I quote again from the Sec- 
retary's report (p. 7) : 

"Practically all these organizations in the 
United States are on what is known as a 
peace footing, which means that an infantry 
company, which upon a war footing should 
have 150 men, now has 65 men; a cavalry 
troop, which upon a war footing should have 
100 men, now has 71 men; an artillery bat- 
tery, which upon a war footing should have 
190 men, now has 133 men. The coast ar- 
tillery companies are always kept on a war 
footing of 104 men each. 

"In addition to work with the troops them- 
selves, the officers of the army are called upon 
to do a great variety of work known as de- 
tached service. For instance, the engineers 
have 66 officers detached for river and harbor 
work, and the other branches of the army 



IN THE UNITED STATES 89 

have 578 officers of the line detached for serv- 
ice in training the organized militia of the sev- 
eral States, on duty at schools, recruiting, etc. 

"As a result, scarcely any unit in the army 
ever has its proper complement of officers, 
and the need for an increase of officers is 
urgent and imperative. In continental United 
States we had in the mobile army on June 30, 
1914, 1,495 officers and 29,405 men* 

"We have a reserve — that is, men who 
have been trained in the army and under the 
terms of their enlistment are subject to be 
called back to the colors in time of war — con- 
sisting of 16 men." 

Now, "the wayfaring men, though fools," 
can understand that we cannot expect to 
resist successfully an invasion of 240,000 men 
with an army of 29,405 men. 

What does the Secretary of War, realizing 
the responsibility which goes with his great 
office, propose to do in order to rectify this 
glaring state of unpreparedness ? His propo- 
sition, as I have previously stated, is ex- 

* The italics are mine. 



90 MILITARY SITUATION 

tremely modest. I quote again from his re- 
port (pp. 10-11), and though the quotation is 
long, I do not apologize for taking up your time 
with it, for it is the nub of the whole matter: 

"My recommendation of what we should 
immediately do is to fill up the existing or- 
ganizations which compose the aggregate mo- 
bile army force just mentioned to their full 
strength. This would require 25,000 men. 
In addition to the enlisted men just men- 
tioned, we should be authorized to obtain 
1,000 more officers. The legislation to ac- 
complish these purposes would be of the very 
simplest character, being merely authoriza- 
tions to the department to do these things. 

"On June 30, 1914, 20.43 per cent of the 
line officers of the army were away from their 
commands. This results in depleting the 
proper quota of instructors in the army. The 
instruction of the organized militia suffers 
wofully from the lack of officers available for 
service with the militia. Efficient officers, 
above all things, cannot be improvised. De- 
pending, as we are, upon a small regular force, 



IN THE UNITED STATES 91 

and contemplating a large expansion in time 
of war, it is essential that we at least should 
not permit the number of officers to fall be- 
low that number which is absolutely requi- 
site for the proper performance of current 
military duties. 

"An increase of the enlisted personnel of the 
army by 25,000 men would accomplish three- 
fold results. It would, as before mentioned, 
bring up to full strength the existing units of 
the mobile army in continental United States, 
and thus supply a more adequate force. 
Second, it would afford training for the of- 
ficers in the command of such units as they 
must command in time of war and would 
prevent, as far as the regular army is con- 
cerned, the crowding of the ranks with raw 
levies which always disorganize and render 
inefficient the organizations into which they 
come. Third, it would be a wise investment 
from the standpoint of economy, in that no 
material increase of overhead charges would 
be necessary, and the addition of these men 
could be effected at a per-capita cost to the 



92 MILITARY SITUATION 

government of about one-third the per-capita 
cost of existing conditions. Since the exist- 
ing physical plant and the administrative or- 
ganization would not have to be in any way 
increased to take care of this increased force, 
the only additional expense would be the 
clothing, feeding, and paying thereof. 

"By the time these 25,000 men could be 
procured the mobile forces in the United 
States, as hereinbefore pointed out, would 
number 24,602; so that after the addition 
the mobile army in continental United States 
would consist of 49,602 men. 

"With the army thus increased, we would 
then be able to undertake the next necessity, 
which is absolutely imperative, and that is 
the preparation of a reserve. The present 
legislation with respect to a reserve has 
proven utterly useless for the purpose, it hav- 
ing produced in 24 months only 16 men, and 
there is little or no hope that it will ever 
properly accomplish its purpose. The reasons 
why it will not do so it is not profitable to 
discuss. 



IN THE UNITED STATES 93 

"Again, without attempting to wait until 
perfection has been reached, it seems to me 
that it is only the part of wisdom to do that 
which we know will produce a beneficial re- 
sult, and one that approximates the best. I 
am firmly convinced that if we can use the 
standing army as a school through which to 
pass men who come into it, with the knowl- 
edge that if they are proficient they can be 
discharged at any time after a year or 18 
months, we will begin at once to build up 
the necessary reserve, and will, for the first 
time in the military history of this country, 
have something approximating a balanced 
organization. There is, unfortunately, oppo- 
sition to this policy. I say 'unfortunately' 
because it is always the part of wisdom, it 
seems to me, to select the best that is pos- 
sible, out of what is obtainable, rather than 
to reject that obtainable best because it is 
not perfection. Some of the opposition is on 
economical grounds, and, in my view, should 
not be determinative if the other considera- 
tions that I have noted are true. Other of 



94 MILITARY SITUATION 

the opposition is based upon the idea that 
1 year or 18 months is not sufficient to train 
a soldier. As to this, it is a curious exhibi- 
tion of mental operations to realize that 
those who make this argument and who have 
to acknowledge that without reserves we must 
depend upon volunteers, are constantly as- 
serting that we can safely rely upon volun- 
teers because they can be thoroughly trained 
in 6 months. It is furthermore true that 
by intensive military training any young man 
of good health and average mentality can 
be made a serviceable soldier in 12 months, 
and, in fact, has been so made. This has 
been tried abroad, and I have caused it to 
be tried under my own administration and 
inspection. Even if there were doubt about 
it, it would not cause a different conclusion 
to be reached by a reasonable man, because 
we certainly would be better off with a re- 
serve of men who had had 1 year's train- 
ing than we are without any reserve at all, 
and having to depend, as we do, upon men 
who have never had any training whatever. 



IN THE UNITED STATES 95 

I caused, about a year ago, recruits, as they 
came in, and without selection, to be organ- 
ized into a battery of artillery, a troop of 
cavalry, and a company of infantry; and 
from my own observation and from the re- 
ports of experts, each of these units, well 
within a year, was found proficient to a very 
high degree. 

"I am therefore firmly convinced that we 
should have immediate legislation dealing 
with the matter of enlistment and reserve. 
I am not so much concerned with the length 
of the enlistment, provided the Secretary of 
War is given power to discharge into the re- 
serve, at the end of 12 months, those who 
have shown themselves proficient up to a 
required standard." 

That is the whole programme at the pres- 
ent moment. I again repeat that it is most 
modest. There will be other things to come 
later — summer camps of university students 
like those which were so splendidly success- 
ful last summer at Burlington and elsewhere; 
instruction in the rudiments of the military 



96 MILITARY SITUATION 

art at public schools, colleges, and universi- 
ties; arrangements by which every young 
man in this great land of ours shall hold in 
his hand before he is 21 years of age an 
army rifle, and aim and fire it at a target; 
enlargement of the Military Academy at West 
Point, and when it reaches the point when it 
can no longer be enlarged, without injury to 
its unique system of instruction, then found 
another West Point on the Pacific coast, and 
subsequently, if needed, a third in the Mis- 
sissippi valley; improvement of the militia, 
and recognition of the great services which 
the men in the militia render by giving up 
to their military duties time which would 
otherwise be spent in recreation — all these 
will come in due time, and their cost will be 
but a trifle compared with the benefits which 
they will produce. But for the present the 
only thing to do is to get squarely behind 
this modest programme of the secretary 
of War, and see that your representa- 
tives in Congress enact it into law be- 
fore Congress adjourns on the fourth 



IN THE UNITED STATES 97 

DAY OF NEXT MARCH, WHICH IS ONLY 40 
DAYS FROM THIS DATE. 

Gentlemen of the Economic Club, I sup- 
pose that it is fair for me to assume that 
when you asked me to address you on this 
subject you considered me competent to dis- 
cuss it, and to give you advice at the end of 
the discussion. What advice have I to give ? 
Simply this: this great subject is, above all 
others, non-partisan. A week ago to-day I 
sat beside the Secretary of War at lunch, and 
at the close of the lunch listened to a great 
speech from him. I say it was a great speech, 
because it was so calm, so forceful, so clearly 
reasoned out, so absolutely convincing to 
every one of his hearers, so entirely devoid of 
hysteria. The speech was made in the Re- 
publican Club of the City of New York, of 
which I have been a member since before the 
time when my hair began to turn gray. The 
audience, which packed the room to the walls, 
was composed of hidebound Republicans; the 
speaker was a Democratic Secretary of War. 
He was received with tumultuous applause 



98 MILITARY SITUATION 

at the beginning; and, though he spoke with- 
out notes, his thought was so logical, so con- 
cise, so free from dogmatism, so absolutely- 
unanswerable, that the applause at the close 
was, I may fairly say, overwhelming. 

Now, what is there to do for you men here 
in Maine? First of all, keep this question 
strictly non-partisan. I fear the partisanship 
of an overzealous gentleman from Massa- 
chusetts has already lessened the chances 
of getting the desired legislation at this ses- 
sion of Congress. Partisanship has no place 
in any question which extends beyond the 
ocean's edge. Next, get the Secretary's re- 
port and read it; ponder over it. His mil- 
itary advisers give their whole lives to this 
question. They are men of good repute, 
they are very able, they do not want war, 
which will make their wives widows and their 
children orphans. But they know what their 
duty is, and they fearlessly do it. It is to 
tell the Secretary truthfully what the real 
situation is, as derived from their lifelong and 
constant study of it, based on data and in- 



IN THE UNITED STATES 99 

formation possessed by no other body of men 
in this country to an equal degree. 

The Secretary was new to this problem 2 
years ago. He frankly says that he is now 
ashamed of the ignorance which he then pos- 
sessed, and which is the ignorance of the 
average highly educated lawyer or business 
man of to-day. But he has said that he 
means from now on to try by every proper 
means to remove this ignorance in others. 
He brought to the problem a trained legal 
mind, accustomed to forming judgment upon 
important legal questions during the years 
that he sat on the bench of the New Jersey 
Court of Appeals. He has given 2 years of 
study to this^case, longer than he ever gave 
to any case which came before him on the 
bench. He has now given you his matured 
conclusions — first a statement of the actual 
facts and then a synopsis of the measures 
which in his judgment are necessary to meet 
this state of facts. 

With the increasing complexity in our af- 
fairs we are obliged every year more and 



100 MILITARY SITUATION 

more to intrust questions of great importance 
to referees, masters in chancery, and other 
experts, for examination and report; and 
when we get their reports, unless they con- 
tain some glaring error, we adopt them and 
put them into operation. No question has 
been so thoroughly examined by experts of 
the highest competence as this question of 
national defense, beginning, as I have said, 
40 years ago by General Sherman and con- 
tinued by his successors in command of the 
army — Sheridan, Schofield, and Miles — and 
especially in recent years by the younger men 
of the General Staff, which was not in exist- 
ence prior to 1903. The result of 40 years' 
study is now before you, condensed and sum- 
marized and brought up to date by the dis- 
tinguished lawyer who now holds the office 
of Secretary of War. Can you do better than 
follow his advice ? 

If you approve it, then see that it is carried 
into effect. Whenever the voters of this 
country make up their minds on any question, 
Congress is quick to respond to their wishes. 



IN THE UNITED STATES 101 

There is need for prompt action. Congress 
will adjourn in less than 6 weeks. Your 
Legislature meets only biennially, but for- 
tunately it is now in session. See that peti- 
tions are sent to it, bearing thousands of 
names, requesting the Legislature to pass 
without delay a joint resolution instructing 
your senators and representatives in Con- 
gress to vote in favor of the adoption of the 
Secretary's recommendations. They have al- 
ready been incorporated in the Army Ap- 
propriation Bill. Last night they were de- 
feated in the House; Monday morning they 
will be before the Senate, where they have 
been already favorably reported from the 
Military Committee. 

There used to be a saying in my youth: 
"As goes Maine, so goes the Union." Since 
you no longer have October elections, this 
saying is not now heard. But the men of 
Maine are just as hard-headed, just as full 
of plain common sense, as they were when you 
held your national elections in October. If 
such a joint resolution is passed by the Legis- 



102 MILITARY SITUATION 

lature of Maine, it will be noted the following 
morning by every State Legislature which is 
in session from New Hampshire to Arizona, 
and from Washington to Florida. 

"Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel 
just." Thus, in Shakespeare's incomparable 
words, meditated Henry VI just after he had 
witnessed the violent quarrel of Warwick and 
Suffolk over the blood-stained corpse of mur- 
dered Gloucester. Five centuries have gone. 
Henry Plantagenet and Richard of York, War- 
wick and Suffolk and Gloucester are but dust. 
Their quarrels, save for Shakespeare, are less 
than dust. Still is it true, as then it was. 

Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel 
just. Ay, true indeed! But quarrels there 
yet will be. And no nation unarmed can en- 
force its quarrel, however just. 



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